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UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION - LABOR DISPUTE DISQUALIFICATION -
WORKERS UNEMPLOYED BY A MULTI-EMPLOYER LocKoUT - Two unions of 
restaurant employees voted to strike the local restaurant industry in order 
to obtain a more favorable master contract with a restaurant owners' asso-
ciation. The unions executed this program by strategically calling strikes 
on only a few key restaurants. The association retaliated by notifying its 
members to lay off their employees in accordance with its previously an-
nounced policy to consider a called strike against one member a called 
strike against all members. The California Unemployment Insurance Ap-
peals Board held that the union employees laid off in response to the asso-
ciation's notice were "voluntarily'' out of work and therefore were disquali-
fied from receiving unemployment benefits in view of the statutory 
disqualification of any worker who "left his work because of a trade dis-
pute."1 In a mandamus proceedings brought by the union employees, the 
superior court reversed the appeals board. On appeal to the California 
Supreme Court, held, reversed, one judge dissenting. Having first used a 
work stoppage as an economic weapon, the union employees were respon-
sible for the foreseeable reprisals and were therefore disqualified from un-
employment benefits for having voluntarily left their work because of a 
trade dispute. Gardner v. State Director of Employment, 53 Cal.2d 23, 346 
P.2d 193 (1959). 
In the majority of states the statutory labor dispute disqualification 
provision is applied as a blanket disqualification to disqualify from un-
employment benefits all workers whose unemployment is the result of a 
1 CAL. UNEMP. INs. ConE §1262 states: "An individual is not eligible for unemployment 
compensation benefits, and no such benefits shall be payable to him, if he left his work 
because of a trade dispute." 
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labor dispute.2 Generally, no distinction is made between unemployment 
resulting from employee strikes and unemployment resulting from employer 
lockouts. In eleven states,a however, some attempt has been made to remedy 
the inequities of blanket disqualification by granting benefits during a labor 
dispute when the responsibility for the unemployment can be traced to the 
employer. But there is diversity of opinion among these eleven states with 
regard to the proper method of determining such responsibility. For exam-
ple, the Minnesota courts attempting to determine whether a particular 
work stoppage was caused by a strike or by a lockout look only to the final 
act which immediately caused the unemployment.4 The Connecticut,ts 
Kentucky,6 Ohio,7 and West Virginia8 courts, on the other hand, look to 
whether the employer or the workers were attempting to change the status 
quo, that is, the existing terms or conditions of work, by the use of a work 
stoppage as economic pressure.9 The approach which has developed in 
California toward this problem is somewhat unique. The California labor 
dispute disqualification provision does not specifically distinguish between 
unemployment resulting from employee strikes and unemployment resulting 
from employer lockouts. Nevertheless, the California Supreme Court has 
established a method of fixing the responsibility for the unemployment in 
a labor dispute by interpreting the statutory disqualification phrase, "left 
his work because of a trade dispute," to mean that the determinative ques-
2 The draft bill of the Federal Social Security Board, initially adopted by most states, 
provides that an individual will be disqualified " ••• for any week with respect to which 
••• his total or partial unemployment is due to a stoppage of work which exists because 
of a labor dispute .•.• " SOCIAL SECURITY BOARD, DRAFT BILLS FOR STATE UNEMPLOYMENT 
COMPENSATION OF THE POOLED FUND AND EMPLOYER REsERVE ACCOUNT TYPES §5 (d) (rev. 
ed. 1937). This provision has been generally interpreted as a blanket disqualification. See, 
e.g., Depaoli v. Ernst, 73 Nev. 79, 309 P.2d 363 (1957); Buchholz v. Cummins, 6 Ill.2d 382, 
128 N.E.2d 900 (1955). In Arizona, District of Columbia, Massachusetts, and New York, 
unemployment resulting from employer lockouts as well as unemployment resulting from 
employee strikes is expressly included in the disqualification provision. 
3 Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Kentucky, Minnesota, New Hampshire, 
Ohio, Pennsylvania, Utah, and West Virginia. 
4E.g., Bucko v. J. F. Quest Foundry Co., 229 Minn. 131, 38 N.W.2d 223 (1949). 
5 This approach is provided by statute in Connecticut: " .•• any individual whose 
unemployment is due to a lockout shall not be disqualified, unless the lockout results from 
demands of the employees, as distinguished from an effort on the part of the employer to 
deprive employees of some advantage they already possess .••• " CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. 
§31-236 (3) (1958). 
6 E.g., Barnes v. Hall, 285 Ky. 160, 146 S.W.2d 929 (1940). 
7 E.g., Zanesville Rapid Transit, Inc. v. Bailey, 168 Ohio St. 351, 155 N.E.2d 202 (1958). 
s Under the ·west Virginia statute there is no disqualification "if an employer shuts 
down his plant or operation or dismisses his employees in order to force wage reduction, 
changes in 4ours or working conditions." W. VA. ConE ANN. §2366 (78) (4) (1955). 
9 Pennsylvania courts have also applied the status quo test. E.g., McGraw '\\Tool Com-
pany v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 176 Pa. Super. 9, 106 A.2d 652 
(1954). But recent decisions indicate that this test will not be determinative in every case. 
E.g., The Punxsutawney Co. v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 188 Pa. 
Super. 569, 149 A.2d 683 (1959). The Arkansas and New Hampshire statutes explicitly 
exclude lockouts from the disqualification provision but, so far, no cases are available 
which indicate what test or tests the Arkansas and New Hampshire courts will apply to 
determine the existence of a lockout. 
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tion is whether the worker voluntarily left his work because of a trade dis-
pute.10 The principal case is an example of the California approach 
extended to the multi-employer lockout situation. 
The present diversity of opinion concerning the proper method of de-
termining the responsibility for the unemployment during a labor dispute, 
together with the probability of more extensive use of the multi-employer 
lockout,U warrants a reappraisal of the labor dispute disqualification prob-
lem in terms of the basic purposes of unemployment compensation. The 
primary purpose is to provide some measure of subsistence to workers in-
voluntarily out of work;12 a secondary purpose is to provide a buffer to 
cyclical economic declines by assuring continued purchasing power to one 
segment of the population,13 It would seem that a proper corollary of these 
purposes is the encouragement of the peaceful settlement of employer-em-
ployee differences.14 Weighed against these purposes and this corollary is 
the legal sanction of the use of strikes and lockouts as economic weapons in 
the collective bargaining arena. Consequently, the major difficulty encoun-
tered by the courts in attempting to fix the responsibility for unemployment 
for labor dispute disqualification purposes is to avoid interfering with the 
collective bargaining process without making unemployment compensation 
subservient to collective bargaining. This difficulty can be appreciably 
minimized without submitting to the inequities of the blanket disqualifica-
tion if the labor dispute disqualification is directed only to situations in 
10 The "volitional" test was first enunciated in Bodinson Mfg. Co. v. California Em-
ployment Commission, 17 Cal.2d 321, 109 P.2d 935 (1941). See also Chrysler Corp. v. 
California Employment Stabilization Commission, 116 Cal. App.2d 8, 253 P.2d 68 (1953); 
McKinley v. California Employment Stabilization Commission, 34 Cal.2d 239, 209 P .2d 
602 (1949); Bunny's Walle Shop v. California Employment Commission, 24 Cal.2d 735, 151 
P.2d 224 (1944). The McKinley case is noted in 35 CORNELL L.Q. 657 (1950); 63 HARv. L. 
REV. 716 (1950); 2 STAN. L. REv. 427 (1950). For a thorough discussion of the California 
court and board decisions, see Feldman, Unemployment Insurance: Its Effect on Trade 
Disputes in California, 5 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 604 (1958). Interpreting a statute which dis-
qualifies workers who are unemployed because of a "strike," Utah adopted the California 
test. See Olof Nelson Construction Co. v. Industrial Commission, 121 Utah 525,243 P.2d 951 
(1952). Colorado, however, applies the status quo test to a similar "strike" disqualification 
provision. See Sandoval v. Industrial Commission, 110 Colo. 108, 130 P.2d 930 (1942). 
11 The use of the multi-employer lockout to preserve the multi-employer bargaining 
basis has been recently approved by the United States Supreme Court in NLRB v. Local 
449, Teamsters Union, 353 U.S. 87 (1957). 
12 This purpose is stated in the declaration of policy section of most statutes. E.g., 
CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE §100. See also DOUGLAS, STANDARDS OF UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE 59 
(1933). J\Iany writers, however, have doubted that this is actually the underlying theme. 
See, e.g., Shadur, Unemployment Benefits and the "Labor Dispute" Disqualification, 17 
U. Cm. L. REv. 294 (1950); Lesser, Labor Disputes and Unemployment Compensation, 55 
YALE L.J. 167 (1945). Nevertheless, the courts have not disputed it. See, e.g., Alamada v. 
Administrator, 137 Conn. 380, 77 A.2d 765 (1951). The difference of opinion, however, seems 
to be more one of semantics than of basic disagreement. See Sanders, Disqualification for 
UnemplO)•ment Insurance, 8 VAND. L. REv. 307,316 (1955). 
13 See Williams, Labor Dispute Disqualification -A Primer and Some Problems, 8 
VAND. L. REv. 338,368 (1955). 
14 See the penetrating analysis of Justice Crockett concurring in Olaf Nelson Construc-
tion Co. v. Industrial Commission, supra note 10. 
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which the workers have placed themselves outside of the purposes of un-
employment compensation, that is, when the workers are voluntarily un-
employed. If this is to be the test, "voluntary" must be accorded a workable 
meaning. It should be recognized that the voluntary nature of the workers' 
actions can be objectively and practically determined only if proper recog-
nition is given to the legal status of the authorized collective bargaining 
agent of the workers and if the voluntary nature of the workers' actions is 
accordingly fixed by reference to the acts of the collective bargaining agent 
performed in their behalf. But how far into the facts of the labor dispute 
itself the courts should look in order to make an objective determination of 
voluntary or involuntary unemployment seems to be an area of basic dis-
agreement among the courts. The California courts, as demonstrated in the 
principal case, assess the responsibility against the party who first takes the 
dispute away from the bargaining table by applying economic pressure. In 
this way the courts can seek the party who was willing to assume the respon-
sibility for the immediate unemployment and the risk of reprisals which 
produce further unemployment. The workers are denied benefits only if 
they are this party. Such a determination provides an objective answer to 
the question of voluntary or involuntary unemployment with a minimum 
of interference with collective bargaining. It fosters the peaceful settlement 
of differences without arbitrarily denying benefits to the workers if peaceful 
negotiations break down. The other tests in use do not achieve such satis-
factory results. The "final act" test of the Minnesota courts, excluding 
blindly all but the final act from consideration, fails to produce any realistic 
determination of voluntary or involuntary unemployment. Further, it is 
particularly objectionable because it tends to encourage wasteful tactical 
maneuvering by both parties in an attempt to place the other party in the 
position of responsibility for the final act.11• The "status quo" test, too, is 
inadequate for it causes the determination to turn on the question of which 
party was attempting to change the status quo, a criterion which may well be 
completely unrelated to whether the workers were involuntarily unem-
ployed.16 A final alternative, decision on the merits of the labor dispute 
itself, has been suggested by some writers as the ultimate test.17 But such a 
test would, in effect, place the administrative agency or the court in the 
position of an arbitrator in every dispute. The tribunal would have to 
15 See Note, 35 CORNELL L.Q. 657 (1950). 
16 See Shadur, supra note 12, at 306. 
17 See, e.g., Shadur, supra note 12. But the courts have generally held that the statute 
prohibits examination of the merits. E.g., The Punxsutawney Co. v. Unemployment Com-
penastion Board of Review, supra note 9. Two writers have advocated a limited determina-
tion of the merits in order to grant benefits when the employer has acted unlawfully or has 
breached his contract and the employees walk out. Williams, The Labor Dispute Dis-
qualification -A Primer and Some Problems, 8 VAND. L. REv. 338 (1955); Comment, 49 
MICH. L. REv. 886 (1951). The determination of the merits approach referred to in the 
text of this note is that advocated in a general case where the employer has not acted 
unlawfully or breached his contract. 
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decide in each case whether the workers were justified in their actions and 
therefore entitled to unemployment benefits. Such a decision interferes with 
the collective bargaining process and goes beyond what is required for labor 
dispute disqualification purposes. In addition, it may not be possible in 
every case to decide whether the workers are justified in their actions since, 
in many cases, the answer will depend upon subjective opinion. Of all these 
approaches, the one used by the California Supreme Court in the principal 
case appears to adhere best to the purposes of unemployment compensation 
in a manner which is sound and workable in theory and practice. 
James B. Blanchard, S. Ed. 
